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Wednesday
14Jan

Fick and Nagl on Afghanistan

Nathaniel Fick and John Nagl, both at the Center for a New America Security, have written an article in the January/February issue of Foreign Policy, titled "Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition." What Fick and Nagl say and write is influential, and CNAS is being portrayed as some sort of Democrat version of what the American Enterprise Institute was for the incoming Bush administration 8 years ago. I agree with much of the article, but I won't go into the points I agree on as those are pretty obvious (i.e. civilian casualties). So I would like to focus on the parts I disagree with, or that I would like to qualify or comment on. 

First up, this passage:

Two myths persistently hamper U.S. policy in Afghanistan. First is the notion that the notorious border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan is ungovernable. [...] However, the absence of a Western-style central government there should not be misconstrued as an absence of governance. The Pashtun tribes along the border have a long history of well-developed religious, social, and tribal structures, and they have developed their own governance and methods of resolving disputes.

With regards to the last sentence, in an idealized version, yes they do. But in reality, on the ground, what did it look like? Certainly as demonstrated by some pre-Soviet war studies there were dispute resolution mechanisms that functioned....at times. At other times people killed each other, wiped out rival formations, died in large numbers, got thrashed by the government, used the government to defeat opponents, rebelled against the government, settled their disputes by violently eliminating their foes, fled as refugees, etc... (basically, a description of many places around the world at various historical points).

There is a danger in such a selective look at Afghan and NWFP history, both in the Nagl/Fick description, and in the polar opposite I posited above as devil’s advocate. Does this necessitate a discussion of the conflicting moral authorities, as illustrated by David B Edwards' analysis of the conflict between religious, state and localized authority systems that people are drawn to, often strategically rather than morally? Or something less philosophical, as in a simple historical survey of conflicts that couldn’t be resolved by traditional dispute resolution mechanisms? Or in a debate on the reification of the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms? It was, depending on the location, somewhere in between the two viewpoints contrasted above. Is that too vague? Well then, welcome to Afghanistan.

And this claim:

Today’s instability is not the continuation of some ancient condition; it is the direct result of decades of intentional dismantling of those traditional structures, leaving extremist groups to fill the vacuum. Re-empowering local leaders can help return the border region to an acceptable level of stability.

“Extremist groups” are hardly anything new. Ghazis, "mad mullahs" and others have risen above, and in spite of, other local authorities, and done their thing before; either by entering a vacuum, or by creating a vacuum and then entering that tautological space (though with less duration and momentum than at present). So now Fick and Nagl see the “re-empowering” of local leaders, whoever they may be. Could it be that many different people see themselves as the “true” local leaders? Could not locals be in conflict with each other and turn the “empowerment” on each other? Or with the Afghan government? With you? I’m not screaming “warlordism” here. It is actually so much more complicated than that. Local input: yes. “Empowerment” without a decent understanding of the micro-dynamics of said area of local “empowerment”: no, bad idea.

And this:

Development often creates security by bolstering people’s confidence in their government and providing a positive, tangible alternative to the Taliban. Take the National Solidarity Program. Under this initiative, villages elect a community council to oversee a development project chosen by village vote. Local people contribute a portion of the capital, labor, or materials, and allocated aid funds are distributed transparently. The results of this bottom-up process have been remarkable: Although the Taliban has burned hundreds of schools across Afghanistan, almost no schools built under this program have been destroyed, largely because the Taliban knows it would win no allies by destroying them.

Hmm. I have heard this before. But I haven’t seen an independent assessment of NSP schools and their exclusion from arson campaigns. Does this claim count NSP schools in places like Badakhshan and Jauzjan? Because that’s obviously not a fair analysis. Are there NSP schools left untouched in areas where there are actually serious problems with insurgents destroying schools and killing teachers? If so, then I say full speed ahead on more NSP-style schools and projects.

More on development:

Although all development is critical in this impoverished country, roads are the single most important path to success in Afghanistan. [...] the U.S. general who was critical of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan pointed at Afghanistan’s ring road from the window of his Black Hawk helicopter, and declared, “Where the road ends, the Taliban begins.”

To which I would add: “And where there are roads, the Taliban is there too.” Roads are important, and should be built, but the above view really exaggerates the importance of roads. The whole “roads and COIN” thing was vigorously debated after Kilcullen's roads and COIN article (also an expert at CNAS), so I won’t bother you with a rehash of the debate.

On 'connecting with the people':

Soldiers in Afghanistan must get out among the people, building and staffing joint security stations with Afghan security forces. That is the only way to disconnect the enemy from the civilians. Persistent presence—living among the population in small groups, staying in villages overnight for months at a time—is dangerous, and it will mean more casualties, but it’s the only way to protect the population effectively. And it will make U.S. troops more secure in the long run.

This imperative to get out among the people extends to U.S. civilians as well. U.S. Embassy staff are almost completely forbidden from moving around Kabul on their own. Diplomacy is, of course, about relationships, and rules that discourage relationships fundamentally limit the ability of American diplomats to do their jobs. The mission in Afghanistan is to stabilize the country, not to secure the embassy.

I absolutely agree with the need for troops to get out more and interact with their counterparts and with Afghan civilians. It would be great if US embassy staff could leave their compounds more often. But wouldn’t these people, compared to foreign NGO workers and journalists, be priority targets? And soft ones at that? I suppose US diplomats moving around a bit more would drum up business for security contractors, at least.

On corruption:

[...] the government of President Hamid Karzai has been crippled by corruption and connections to narcotrafficking. His recent decision to replace the much-reviled minister of the interior is a sign that persistent U.S. complaints about poor governance might be getting through.

While there have been times when American pressure resulted in the removal of a governor, and perhaps even a minister, this has been an on-and-off process and isn't new. As for this particular removal, it doesn’t mean that “complaints about poor governance might be getting through.” If that was true, then I would expect a significant number of ministers, governors, district governors, and police and military leaders to soon be removed. However, I know that I don’t know enough about behind-doors elite level “palace intrigue” in Kabul to know the particular reason for this removal. This minister could actually be “much-reviled,” presumably because of “poor governance”, but I’m sure that a survey of the rumor mill could turn up many other explanations. These might include ethnic bias (he’s Tajik), disloyalty to Karzai (which definitely gets you fired in a unitary state), or even a strategy of the Migdalesque “politics of survival”, i.e. the “big shuffle”. This involves rotating cabinet ministers and governors so that they may not build up too strong an independent support base, but that often leads to low state effectiveness. Perhaps one of these factors coincided with American complaints.

And proof that not all former military are hawks:

Paradox 5: Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.

5-1. Cross-border raids into Pakistan to pursue insurgents have strained U.S. relations with Pakistan at this critical juncture in the Afghan campaign. Pakistan is, of course, inextricably connected to the Afghan insurgency. The Pashtun belt, as the border area between the two countries is known, constitutes the real battleground in this war. Counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan, therefore, are a necessary component of any strategy in Afghanistan. Without Pakistani support, however, unilateral cross-border raids will create more blowback than they are worth.

It seems to be “blowing” pretty hard right now. Can the trans-border “blowback” actually be increased? The Pakistani government is certainly selling this viewpoint. But shouldn't there be raids/airstrikes, such as the one that just killed two high level al Qaeda operatives? How about against Haqqani network operatives and the infrastructure that's part of a suicide bombing campaign that is directed at Afghan and foreign coalition civilians and security forces? Or against Taliban and Hizb targets that are part of an operation that would like no restrictions on its unilateral raids into Afghanistan from a safe haven inside Pakistan? Should such a secure safe haven be conceded when the Pakistani government has shown that it can not (and will not, in the form of the ISI) control the area and stop militants? Should there not be “hot pursuit?”

Many questions. Obviously, nobody is seriously calling for a Gaza-style visit across the border. But I’m sure the advice gainst conducting operations across the Durand Line will be ignored by Obama when he assumes the presidency. I’m sure (based on his rhetoric) he won’t let the Pakistani government hold Afghanistan and the coalition countries hostage to its “it will all fall apart and the extremists will get their hands on our nukes if you don’t listen to us” imminent doom rhetoric. The end solution requires Pakistan to be involved, of course. But since the threats across the Durand Line are not potential threats, but operations underway, shouldn't President-elect Obama give the green light to continue hitting militants? I would put money down betting that he does.

More on Pakistan:

5-2. A better strategy for persuading Pakistan to act as an ally—and not a spoiler—in Afghanistan involves giving up the short-term tactical gains of such raids in favor of the regional diplomacy necessary to broaden and deepen the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Even after Islamist extremists bombed the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September in an attempt to assassinate the new civilian leadership of Pakistan, the Pakistani Army remains more focused on the perceived threat from India than on the actual threat from inside its own country’s borders. U.S. and international efforts to broker confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan are likely to have a far greater impact on Pakistani counterinsurgency efforts than any number of unilateral U.S. raids.

Regional diplomacy? Absolutely. But the Pakistani military power elites have consistently seen non-Islamist governments in Afghanistan as an existential threat. This is something to do with Afghan governments consistently refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the border based on some ethnic issues that Pakistani strategists think can supposedly be overcome with Islamist ideology in Afghanistan. If everything was sorted out with India and with Afghanistan, would the Pakistani government march its military into the tribal areas and rout the militants? Powerful forces within the military see many of these militants as their allies (strategically and/or ideologically), so I doubt the potential effectiveness of this optimistic view. Of course, I’m not saying “no to diplomacy.” I agree with the need to pursue these avenues, but not in an “all the eggs in one basket” style.

Read the full Fick/Nagl article here.


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Reader Comments (3)

On that last point about Ind/Pak diplomacy, I agree that they miss the point about it, but you're not giving a full reading of it either:

If everything was sorted out with India and with Afghanistan, would the Pakistani government march its military into the tribal areas and rout the militants? Powerful forces within the military see many of these militants as their allies (strategically and/or ideologically), so I doubt the potential effectiveness of this optimistic view.

Is that the only possible outcome with good results? What about the fact that there is a faction of the army/intel community in Pakistan that generates authority for itself with the "India is out to get us" and Kashmir issues? Wouldn't an official negotiation and settlement of the Kashmir issue, as well as more extensive diplomatic links between the two countries, have the effect of marginalizing that faction? There is very little public support for the positions that faction holds, and yet the approach has been to accommodate it, not to challenge it.

I don't envision Ind/Pak diplomacy to be the only and complete solution to things along the border, but that along with Iranian and regional diplomacy seems to be a precondition for other forms of progress.

Jan 15, 2009 at 16:17 | Unregistered CommenterIan

Ian, RE: "What about the fact that there is a faction of the army/intel community in Pakistan that generates authority for itself with the "India is out to get us" and Kashmir issues? Wouldn't an official negotiation and settlement of the Kashmir issue, as well as more extensive diplomatic links between the two countries, have the effect of marginalizing that faction? There is very little public support for the positions that faction holds, and yet the approach has been to accommodate it, not to challenge it."

My opinion is that the Afghanistan side of things has its own momentum, and can continue without the Kashmir/India issue. If "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, with an eye to India, was the only issue then I would be more optimistic. But I believe other issues such as Pashtunistan, access to Central Asia (with Gwadar as the outlet/inlet) and the factor of ideology (plenty in the ISI don't just see Islamist ideology as a tool, but as an ends) can maintain a high level of momentum even if there was some "grand bargain" with India and others. Of course, I may be overly influenced by Afghan and Pakistani skeptics, of which there are many. The opposite view would be best represented, in a nuanced form, by that Foreign Affairs article written by Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid.

As for Kashmir, I would of course love to see that issue resolved for its own sake, and for that of the people of India and Pakistan.

Jan 16, 2009 at 2:30 | Registered CommenterChristian Bleuer

Fair enough. I was thinking primarily in terms of the seeming zero-sum between Pakistan's hostility to India and its ability to put pressure on the militants in the border areas. E.g., the reports, maybe inaccurate, that Pakistan and redeployed troops toward India from the tribal areas after Mumbai--as well as the rumors that Hamid Gul had something to do with the attacks.

Thanks for the excellent post--I always enjoy your writing.

Jan 17, 2009 at 21:29 | Unregistered CommenterIan

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